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Controlled processing is often referred to as “voluntary” or “willful” and therefore
assumed to depend entirely on conscious processes. Recent studies using
subliminal-priming paradigms, however, have started to question this assumption.
Specifically, these studies have shown that subliminally presented stimuli can induce
adjustments in control. Such findings are not immediately reconcilable with the view
that conscious and unconscious processes are separate, with each having its own neural
substrates and modus operandi. We propose a different theoretical perspective that
suggests that conscious and unconscious processes might be implemented by the same
neural substrates and largely perform the same neural computations, with the distinction
between the two arising mostly from the quality of representations (although not all
brain regions may be capable of supporting conscious representations). Thus, stronger
and more durable neuronal firing would give rise to conscious processes; weaker or
less durable neuronal firing would remain below the threshold of consciousness but
still be causally efficacious in affecting behavior. We show that this perspective naturally
explains the findings that subliminally presented primes induce adjustments in cognitive
control. We also highlight an important gap in this literature: whereas subliminal-priming
paradigms demonstrate that an unconsciously presented prime is sufficient to induce
adjustments in cognitive control, they are uninformative about what occurs under standard
task conditions. In standard tasks, the stimuli themselves are consciously perceived;
however, the extent to which the processes that lead to adjustments in control are
conscious or unconscious remains unexplored. We propose a new paradigm suitable to
investigate these issues and to test important predictions of our hypothesis that conscious
and unconscious processes both engage the same control machinery, differing mostly in
the quality of the representations.
Keywords: cognitive control, conflict monitoring, conscious, medial prefrontal cortex, prefrontal cortex, subliminal
priming, unconscious
Humans and other animals adjust their behavior flexibly in the
pursuit of goals. Cognitive control mechanisms are the set of
processes that allow for such flexible adjustments. For instance,
cognitive control is necessary to override automatic or habit-
ual responses when they conflict with current goals—a process
that has been long studied through tasks such as the Stroop
or Simon Spatial Incompatibility tasks. The common ground of
these tasks is the experimental induction of conflict between a
prepotent response and a weaker response that is correct accord-
ing to the task goal. Often this conflict is induced by different
features of the same stimulus (e.g., the location of an arrow
relative to the midline and the direction in which the arrow
is pointing), with one of the features stimulating a prepotent
response tendency (e.g., a left response to an arrow presented
to the left of the midline) and the other feature indicating
the response that is correct according to the task goal (e.g., a
right response to a right-pointing arrow, even if it is presented
to the left of the midline). To resolve the conflict induced by
these incongruent stimuli, cognitive control mechanisms provide
top-down biases that facilitate the goal-directed response over
the more automatic one (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Maia and
Cleeremans, 2005). Conscious will has been classically assumed
to govern this type of controlled processing: i.e., voluntary, con-
scious processes would be required to select the goal-directed
response.
The detection and resolution of conflict, importantly, are non-
static processes that depend heavily on the task context. An
effect common to all conflict tasks, the conflict-adaptation effect,
illustrates this contextual dependency. Conflict adaptation is the
improvement in the resolution of conflict following the experi-
ence of conflict. Such adaptation typically occurs on a trial-to-
trial basis (Gratton et al., 1992; Egner, 2007) but it also arises on
a blockwise basis (Tzelgov et al., 1992; Carter et al., 2000). The
description of the conflict-adaptation effect prompted the devel-
opment of influential models of cognitive control that accounted
for both conflict resolution and its contextual adaptability. The
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influential conflict-monitoring model (Botvinick et al., 2001), for
example, proposed that a monitoring system, putatively located
in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and activated by con-
flict, signaled to the prefrontal cortex (PFC) the need to further
boost top-down biases that enhanced task-relevant information-
processing pathways. As a result, task-relevant responses would
be facilitated following conflict, and conflict resolution would,
therefore, be more efficient, thereby explaining the conflict-
adaptation effect. Despite some findings that are at odds with
this model and the existence of several competing theories
(Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Brown and Braver, 2005; Critchley,
2005; Carter and van Veen, 2007), substantial evidence supports
several aspects of this model (MacDonald et al., 2000; Botvinick
et al., 2001; Kerns et al., 2004; Kerns, 2006; Carter and van Veen,
2007).
The conflict-monitoring model does not itself address the
potential role of consciousness in controlled processing [despite
the close relation between similar cognitive-control models and
models of consciousness (Maia and Cleeremans, 2005)]. We
suggest, however, that one can take advantage of the model’s
clearly delineated mechanisms to consider which cognitive con-
trol mechanisms might be dependent on conscious processing
and which might potentially operate unconsciously. Such an
approach allows us to move from simple descriptive questions
about the conscious or unconscious correlates of behavior to
more detailed questions about the potential implication and roles
of conscious and unconscious processing in the mechanisms of
cognitive control. For example, we can reformulate the ques-
tion of whether conflict adaptation requires conscious knowledge
to the more mechanistic question of whether the detection of
conflict by the ACC and the subsequent strengthening of con-
trol by the PFC require conscious knowledge. Importantly, such
a reformulation is not merely “cosmetic,” as it raises multi-
ple empirically testable questions about the dependence of the
different components of the model on conscious versus uncon-
scious processes. For example, does the detection of conflict
by the ACC need to become conscious for conflict adaptation
to occur? If so, what level of conscious knowledge is required:
explicit knowledge about the preceding conflict or just a vague
feeling that performance is not going well? And what is the
relationship between ACC activation with conflict and explicit
knowledge of conflict? Does the ACC form the core of such
knowledge, does it instead receive information about that knowl-
edge from other brain region(s) that modulate its activation, or
are the two completely independent? Moving from the detection
of conflict by the ACC to the strengthening of control by the
PFC, does such strengthening reflect a willful, conscious cogni-
tive act, or is perhaps the order of causality the opposite, with
the engagement of PFC giving rise to the “illusion” (Wegner,
2002) of, say, deciding to pay more attention to a given stimulus
feature?
Here we will use the term consciousness to refer exclusively to
the content of conscious representations. As articulated in more
detail elsewhere, we take consciousness to be the result of a global
constraint satisfaction process in which the winning neuronal
coalition determines both accessibility and phenomenal experi-
ence (Maia and Cleeremans, 2005). We will center our discussion
on whether conscious representations of current events, goals,
and contexts are needed for conflict resolution and its con-
textual adaptation. We will further assume that these con-
scious representations, in contrast with long-term knowledge
that is embedded in synaptic weights, rely on more transient,
active representations encoded in the firing patterns of neurons.
These active representations, unlike weight-based knowledge, can
be accessible to other systems and are thought to be neces-
sary, though not sufficient, for conscious awareness (Maia and
Cleeremans, 2005). Even when different active representations
originate in the same neuronal ensemble, the quality of the
representations—i.e., their strength, duration, stability, distinc-
tiveness, etc.,—might render only some of these representations
accessible to consciousness. Some brain regions may potentially
contribute less or not at all to conscious experience (Godwin
et al., in press), so in those regions, even high-quality repre-
sentations might not lead to conscious awareness. For instance,
converging evidence suggests that while perceptual information
in the ventral visual stream can become conscious (Doesburg
et al., 2009), perceptual representations in the dorsal stream
for visuomotor action may not be accessible to consciousness
(Goodale and Milner, 1992, 2005). The regions involved in con-
flict monitoring and cognitive control, however, seem particu-
larly likely to be implicated in conscious awareness (Morsella,
2005).
The core of our hypothesis is that the same types of
representations in the same brain regions may give rise to
either conscious or unconscious knowledge, depending on the
quality of the representation—an idea that is consistent with
a variety of lines of evidence, old (Kinsbourne, 1988) and
new (Maia and Cleeremans, 2005). Such an effect may be
direct, with high-quality representations becoming conscious
per se, or it may be due to the fact that high-quality rep-
resentations will have a higher probability of entering the
“global workspace” (Baars, 1988; Dehaene et al., 2003) or win-
ning the global constraint-satisfaction competition (Maia and
Cleeremans, 2005). Even weak (and therefore unconscious) rep-
resentations, however, can be causally efficacious in changing
neuronal processing downstream (Cleeremans, 2004). Thus, we
should not be surprised if unconscious processing—elicited,
for example, by the subliminal presentation of stimuli (which
simply elicits weaker representations)—produces effects sim-
ilar to, but weaker than, supraliminal presentation of the
same stimuli. This overarching theoretical perspective about
the nature of conscious versus unconscious processing also
allows us to cast our original questions in even more mech-
anistic terms, by asking whether active representations of a
special quality are required for controlled processes and, if
so, which specific control mechanisms require these special
representations.
SUBLIMINAL-PRIMING STUDIES OF THE CAPABILITY
OF UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSES TO INFLUENCE
COGNITIVE CONTROL
Subliminal-priming studies (also known as masked-priming
studies) have been used to assess whether unconscious processes
affect a variety of cognitive, affective, and behavioral processes
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(Eimer and Schlaghecken, 2003; van den Bussche et al., 2009).
In these studies, stimuli are presented very briefly before being
masked by another stimulus, so that the initial stimulus remains
outside of awareness. Whether this manipulation does indeed
render perception of the initial stimulus fully unconscious is
not always uncontroversial—for example, at least some of these
studies might be underpowered to detect above-chance discrim-
ination of masked primes and thus wrongly assume unconscious
perception of those primes (Szczepanowski and Pessoa, 2007).
Nonetheless, the subliminal-priming approach is often assumed
to indeed make perception of the initial stimulus (the prime)
unconscious. For this reason, this approach has been used in
conflict tasks to assess whether unconscious processes can affect
cognitive control. Using masked and unmasked primes, an early
study found that only consciously perceived conflict triggered
conflict adaptation (Kunde, 2003). This result was interpreted
as proof that only conscious information is used to adjust con-
trol. Later reports, however, seem directly at odds with this
interpretation. Recent work has shown that both “unconscious
errors”—defined as Go trials that followed a masked No-Go
cue, but in which participants executed a response—and uncon-
sciously primed conflict induce subsequent adjustments in behav-
ior (Cohen et al., 2009; van Gaal et al., 2010). In particular, even
conflict stimuli that are presented subliminally can induce conflict
adaptation. These and other findings suggest instead that uncon-
scious processing of information has many complex features that
were once thought to be unique to its conscious counterpart
(Wokke et al., 2011). Thus, unconscious processing of infor-
mation seemingly can lead to adjustments in cognitive control.
These findings, along with others similarly demonstrating that
unconscious processes have many of the characteristics tradition-
ally associated with conscious processes, are fully consistent with
our view that the same brain regions can perform the same set
of processes when stimulated subliminally and when stimulated
supraliminally, with the main difference being the quality and
strength of the resulting representations and processing. Further
support for our view comes from the finding that the magnitude
of the conflict-adaptation effect varies with the masking strength
of the conflict-inducing prime: conflict adaptation following con-
scious primes is considerably greater than conflict adaptation
following unconscious primes (van Gaal et al., 2010). In our
view, this occurs simply because the subliminal presentation of
stimuli does not have sufficient duration to elicit strong and
durable neuronal firing, whereas the supraliminal presentation
does.
Other studies have exploited both positive and negative effects
in subliminal priming. While masked primes initially activate
responses associated with the prime, thereby facilitating responses
to targets that are compatible with it, at longer delays between
prime and target this response facilitation turns into an inhi-
bition (Eimer and Schlaghecken, 1998). A recent study used
subliminal presentation of arrow primes (corresponding or non-
corresponding with the target arrow) and measured the effect of
long and short prime-target intervals on the response to a tar-
get arrow flanked by other arrows (congruent or incongruent
flankers; Boy et al., 2010). The study showed that prime-induced
inhibition at long intervals differentially affected responses to the
current target depending on whether the target’s flankers were
congruent or incongruent with it. When the prime differed from
the target, there was almost no additional cost for responses to
incongruent as compared with congruent trials. Because sublim-
inal priming interacted with current-trial congruence but not
with conflict adaptation (i.e., the effect of unconscious inhibition
was the same on incongruent trials preceded by an incongru-
ent trial and on incongruent trials preceded by a congruent
trial), the authors argued that unconscious inhibition might sep-
arate two types of control processes: a responsive (post-stimulus)
control, related to conflict resolution, which might share motor
mechanisms with unconscious processes, and a preparatory (pre-
stimulus) control linked to conflict adaptation and which is
impervious to unconscious inhibition. Although this distinction
is appealing, an alternative account of these results is that uncon-
scious inhibition does not affect either pre- or post-stimulus
control. The putative effect on post-stimulus control—the above-
mentioned finding that unconscious inhibition nearly abolished
the extra cost for incongruent as compared to congruent trials—
can in fact be given a simple explanation: at long intervals,
primes that differ from the target inhibit the response tendency
to the non-target direction, and therefore flankers that signal
that direction have a weaker effect. Thus, there is reduced con-
flict when an incongruent trial is presented after such primes,
and the response to the target becomes easier. Conversely, at
short intervals, primes aligned with the target may facilitate reac-
tion times in a nonspecific manner without weakening the effect
of flankers, and thus, without reducing conflict. Regardless of
the interpretation, since primes in this study were always pre-
sented unconsciously and flankers were presented consciously,
these results provide additional support for our view that both
conscious and unconscious stimulation of response tendencies
engage overlapping brain regions and therefore interact with each
other.
In summary, putting aside potential sensitivity issues in estab-
lishing the chance-level discrimination of masked primes nec-
essary to assume unconscious processing (Szczepanowski and
Pessoa, 2007), the subliminal-priming studies reviewed here pro-
vide strongly suggestive evidence that information that is uncon-
sciously processed can induce certain events (e.g., conflict or
error) that in turn engage control mechanisms.
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO STUDY UNCONSCIOUS
INFLUENCES ON COGNITIVE CONTROL
Under our suggestion that conscious and unconscious processes
might share common mechanisms and differ mostly in terms
of representation quality, unconscious processes would indeed
be expected to influence control mechanisms, like their con-
scious counterparts do (Suhler and Churchland, 2009). Future
studies should seek to elucidate whether the quality of repre-
sentations and the conscious experiences associated with them
have an influence on control, and if so, on which components
of control. Our prediction is that their influence on control will
not be qualitatively different but will be quantitatively stronger
than that of unconscious processes, simply because stronger
representations—potentially further amplified when they enter
consciousness’s “global workspace” (Baars, 1988; Dehaene et al.,
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2003) or become part of the attractor state that solves the global
constraint-satisfaction problem (Maia and Cleeremans, 2005)—
have greater causal efficacy. We suggest that a sensitive assessment
of the conscious knowledge that participants are able to report
during a standard conflict task, in parallel with behavioral and
imaging measures, would help tackle these issues. Here, we delin-
eate this multimodal approach.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SUBCOMPONENTS OF COGNITIVE
CONTROL
As mentioned earlier, influential models of cognitive control
have successfully accounted for behavioral effects in conflict
tasks by incorporating several interacting neural components. In
particular, the conflict-monitoring model accounts for conflict
adaptation via a projection from a conflict-monitoring unit to
a control unit, thereby allowing the occurrence of conflict on
incongruent trials to trigger adjustments in control that improve
performance on subsequent trials (Botvinick et al., 2001). The
conflict-monitoring unit and the control unit are hypothesized
to map onto the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), respectively. Thus,
the model predicts that dACC conflict-related activity on the
current trial predicts both greater DLPFC activity and greater
adjustments in behavior on the subsequent trial—a prediction
that has been confirmed empirically (Kerns et al., 2004). Research
in nonhuman primates has added to this picture of how sub-
components of cognitive control interact. In particular, neuronal
recordings in behaving monkeys have demonstrated that activity
during inter-stimulus intervals in a population of neurons in the
principal sulcus represents the previous trial’s conflict (Mansouri
et al., 2007). Furthermore, lesions to this region impair behav-
ioral adjustments following conflict. These findings led to an
extension of the conflict-monitoring model that posits that a
mnemonic system encoding a representation of previous conflict
(before the presentation of the following stimulus) is responsi-
ble for adjustments in behavior in the subsequent trial (Mansouri
et al., 2009).
Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we
recently identified a neural system, comprising the rostral dorso-
medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) and portions of the DLPFC,
that encodes the history of previously experienced conflict dur-
ing inter-stimulus intervals in humans (Horga et al., 2011).
We also demonstrated that this system reflects not only con-
flict in the immediately preceding trial but also the longer
history of conflict in several preceding trials. This system inter-
acted with a second system that was engaged by conflict in the
current trial, an interaction that predicted trial-to-trial behav-
ioral adjustments prompted by conflict (i.e., adjustments in the
response to the current conflict trial relative to the response
to the preceding conflict trial). In our study, inter-stimulus
activation in the DMPFC-DLPFC had control-like features: it
tracked conflict history and subsequently modulated other brain
regions in a top-down manner. Unfortunately, this study was
not designed to evaluate the degree to which conscious knowl-
edge of previous conflict history was related to the activation
of this control system or to the behavioral adjustments that
ensued.
We interpreted the information encoded in the inter-stimulus
DMPFC-DLPFC activation as either a memory trace of past
conflict or a strategic expectancy. This distinction between a reac-
tive memory process that is passively activated by conflict and
a proactive process that anticipates the occurrence of a certain
stimulus type and prepares an optimal action strategy accord-
ingly, respectively, could potentially be important to understand
the mechanisms of cognitive control. One way to parse out
a purely mnemonic versus an expectancy account is to eval-
uate whether inter-stimulus activation in the DMPFC-DLPFC
system can predict subsequent strategies, specifically certain ocu-
lomotor strategies that would only be beneficial if a stimulus
of the expected type (e.g., incongruent) appears. Thus, mon-
itoring a strategy such as the focusing of spatial attention—
relevant to the resolution of conflict in spatial conflict tasks
(Botvinick et al., 2001)—could be a viable way to determine if
conflict is expected (whether such expectation is conscious or
unconscious). That is, if inter-stimulus activation in the DMPFC-
DLPFC system—measured with hemodynamic or electrophys-
iological imaging—predicted the spatial focusing of attention
on the following trial, then this activation would be consistent
with an expectancy account. This finding would be particularly
compelling if such activation influenced oculomotor strategy, as
measured with eye tracking, before an individual has enough
time to process the stimulus (and potentially re-adjust the strat-
egy after stimulus presentation), and most importantly, if the
oculomotor strategy were specifically beneficial for respond-
ing to conflict trials but impaired performance on non-conflict
trials.
CONSCIOUS KNOWLEDGE AND CONFLICT ADAPTATION
The potential role of consciousness in conflict adaptation could
be examined by inquiring about participants’ knowledge of their
past conflict history and their use of strategy at specific time peri-
ods during a standard conflict task (Figure 1), and determining
the extent to which such knowledge mediates behavioral adap-
tations. The inter-stimulus interval, for the reasons presented
above, may be an appropriate time period for these inquiries. To
avoid common failures in reporting conscious knowledge when
open-ended questions are used, close-ended questions would
be preferred (Maia and McClelland, 2004). The questionnaire
should focus on the subcomponents of control that underlie
conflict adaptation. At least two aspects of the control mech-
anism underlying conflict adaptation seem certain: it depends
on prior conflict and its engagement benefits performance, i.e.,
once the control mechanism is engaged it contributes to improve
subsequent conflict resolution. Consequently, the questionnaire
should target participants’ knowledge about the type of stimuli
presented on preceding trials and their conscious expectations
concerning the upcoming stimulus. Participants may possibly
expect repetitions or alternations of certain stimulus types given
the preceding sequence, even if stimuli are arranged in a random
series (Huettel et al., 2002). The second goal of these inquiries
would deal with specific cognitive or behavioral strategies that
the individual might deploy in anticipation of the upcoming
trial (e.g., focusing spatial attention on a specific region of the
screen, preparing an “if-then” strategy, etc.). Lastly, subjective but
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FIGURE 1 | Integrated assessment of the neural bases of conflict
adaptation, potential strategic changes in the allocation of spatial
attention, and adaptive changes in behavior, together with assessment
of the accompanying conscious knowledge and of whether such
knowledge plays a role in strategic changes in spatial attention or in
performance adjustments. Simultaneous, multimodal assessment of brain
activity, oculomotor behavior, choice and reaction-time behavior, and
conscious knowledge would permit an understanding of the inter-relations
between all of these variables. Some questions of particular interest would
include: (1) whether awareness of each of the components of control is
associated with greater activity in the corresponding brain regions (as
predicted by our view on the nature of consciousness); (2) whether
adjustments in oculomotor behavior that potentially reflect an expectancy of
a certain type of stimulus are associated with conscious knowledge of such
expectancy and of its effect on the allocation of spatial attention; and
(3) whether behavioral adjustments (of oculomotor behavior or of choice and
reaction times) are fully mediated by conscious knowledge or whether
instead they can be adaptively influenced by neural activity in the PFC
without accompanying conscious knowledge (as predicted by our hypothesis
that neural activity in these circuits can be causally efficacious even it is not
accompanied by conscious knowledge). pMFC, posterior medial frontal
cortex (encompassing the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the
pre-supplementary motor area); PFC, prefrontal cortex (specifically, rostral
dorsomedial, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex).
non-specific sensations such as arousal or attention should also
be assessed, as participants might not explicitly know, for exam-
ple, the history of conflict in the recent trials but nonetheless
have a subjective sense that they need to pay, or are paying, more
attention following conflict trials.
BRAIN-KNOWLEDGE-BEHAVIOR ANALYSES
A multimodal approach that includes recordings of neural activ-
ity, assessment of conscious knowledge, and behavioral measure-
ments should be used to permit the assessment of the relations
between these three variables. Our perspective that conscious and
unconscious knowledge may differ mostly in the intensity and
duration of neuronal firing predicts that greater neuronal acti-
vation measured, for example, with fMRI, should correlate with
knowledge that is more conscious. In addition, greater activa-
tion should also, naturally, have a greater effect on behavioral
adjustments. Thus, to some extent, we expect neuronal activa-
tion, conscious knowledge, and behavioral adjustments to be
substantially correlated. However, we suggest that even activation
that remains below the threshold required to enter consciousness
can still be causally efficacious; thus, we predict that behav-
ioral adjustments can occur even in the absence of conscious
knowledge. Using path analysis, we recently showed that greater
activity in the aforementioned DMPFC-DLPFC system during
inter-trial intervals predicted greater behavioral adjustment to
conflict on a trial-by-trial basis (Horga et al., 2011). With the
measure of conscious knowledge, we could also test whether
the effects of activation strength on behavior are mediated by
conscious knowledge (Figure 1). The addition of eye tracking
to this design, if specific oculomotor behaviors were linked
to conflict adaptation, could further unravel the relationships
between neural activation, strategic expectancies (reflected in
oculomotor behavior), adaptive improvements in performance,
and potential conscious knowledge about the strategic expectan-
cies and their influence on behavior. In summary, this multimodal
approach would allow us to assess whether, for purposes of con-
flict adaptation, conscious experiences are epiphenomenal or
whether instead they play a central role in mediating the rela-
tionship between activity in the regions that have previously
been implicated in conflict adaptation and adaptive control of
behavior.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Subliminal-priming paradigms have thus far been the method of
choice for studying the role of unconscious processing in cog-
nitive control. Despite some early contradictory findings, over-
all these studies suggest that unconsciously triggered conflict
can induce adjustments in control mechanisms. These findings
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add to others that similarly demonstrate that unconscious pro-
cesses possess several advanced characteristics (e.g., flexibility)
that have traditionally been associated with conscious processes
(Wokke et al., 2011). The dichotomy between higher-order con-
trol mechanisms that are conscious versus less complex, reflective
mechanisms that are unconscious—each of which with its own
separate neural substrates and processes—therefore, now seems
less appealing than it once did. As an alternative to this idea,
we have suggested a more graded view, in which conscious and
unconscious processes might rely on the same neural substrates
and perform the same processing, differing mostly on the quality
of the representation. We have shown that this perspective seam-
lessly explains the bulk of the literature on unconscious influences
in cognitive control.
One limitation of the subliminal-priming approach is that it
seeks only to determine whether processes initiated by a sublimi-
nally presented prime affect cognitive control. Such an approach
is, therefore, uninformative about the potential involvement of
conscious versus unconscious processing under more standard
task conditions (in which the stimuli themselves are presented
supraliminally, but their effect on behavioral adjustments could
be mediated by conscious or unconscious processing). We, there-
fore, proposed a complementary approach that uses standard task
conditions but adds a questionnaire to assess participants’ con-
scious knowledge. We indicated how a multi-modal approach
could be used to understand the relation between activation
in cognitive control areas, conscious knowledge, and behavioral
adjustments—including assessing whether conscious knowledge
mediates the effect of activation in cognitive control areas on
behavioral adjustments. Overall, we hope that both the theoretical
perspective that we articulated in this article and our suggestions
about a complementary empirical approach to these issues could
be of value in guiding future thinking and experimentation in
this area.
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